Navy Command - Authorisation Group Chair
| Posting date: | 01 May 2024 |
|---|---|
| Salary: | £43,080 per year |
| Additional salary information: | 11631 |
| Hours: | Full time |
| Closing date: | 31 May 2024 |
| Location: | G84 8HL |
| Remote working: | On-site only |
| Company: | Ministry of Defence |
| Job type: | Permanent |
| Job reference: | 351411 |
Summary
On Behalf of the HMNB Clyde Faslane Site Operator (SFS) and appropriate Assistant Head Capability the AG Chair is responsible for ensuring the Authorisee of the safe introduction of new systems, structures and components such as the effect on ‘Day to Day’ control of NP, NW, and WiH Authorised Activities and that the Risk from the Activities is manged such that it is reduced ‘As Low as Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP). The AG Chair discharges this responsibility by ensuring:
A. Suitable and sufficient Operating Instructions (AC 24) are in place for all Authorised Activites and that they are Authorised for use prior to commencement of the Activity e.g., AG Procedures, AG Instructions and HP Logics. (NUC 6.1 and 1.2) Ensuring:
That the Production, Maintenance and Development of the OIs is consistent with Authorisee’s Policies and Standards and Relevant Good Practice (RGP) in the wider Nuclear Enterprise (ONR/DNSR Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs), Technical Inspection Guides (TIGs), Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and NRPA Level 4 Methodologies etc.
That the OIs fully address the Safety Case and Design Intent Requirements with identification/highlight of those aspects critical to maintaining the CSFs i.e., AC23 Operating Rules/Operating Constraints and AC27 Engineered/Administrative Safeguards.
The OIs are consistent with industry good practice and legislative requirements e.g., LOLER, PUWER, RIDDOR, COSHH, Confined Space Regulations etc.
The OIs are cognitive to the end user (operator) this being achieved by demonstration and understanding and where appropriate formal training.
The OIs are appropriately verified and validated by appropriate SME and Operators this including where appropriate ‘slow run through’ of the scoped activity.
The OIs are formally reviewed at the Nuclear Services Authorisation Group (NSAG) and authorised for use.
The OIs are periodically reviewed to ensure they remain consistent with the Safety Case and Design Intent Requirements and RGP with appropriate capture of LFE.
B Appropriate oversight and supervision are imparted on activities important to the delivery and maintenance of Nuclear and Explosive Safety (AC26). (NUC 6.1, 1.1 and 1.2) Ensuring:
That all activities are appropriately permissioned prior to commencement with appropriate SMAs, and control is in place e.g., Hold Point Control, Nuclear Safety Clearance (NSCF, C12), Activity Logics etc.
That High Hazard Activities (i.e., those that can directly lead to a loss of CSFs) e.g., Fault recovery on Class 1 and Class 2; ensure direct control is imparted with a duly authorised co-ordinator appointed in accordance with AC26.
3. Directly impart oversight, supervision, and control on the following activities:
C* Embarkation (High Hazard)
Fault Recovery on Class 1 and Class 2 SSC (High Hazard)
As relief PAG Chair Docking of LUSMs at Rosyth
As relief Chair for Shiplift Docking of NPW including dockings with NW and TWS embarked (High Hazard)
4. The formal appointment of Nuclear Procedure Co-ordinators (NPCs) and appropriate oversight of their maintenance of qualification.
C. That Nuclear / Explosive safety is maintained when Site Activities not scoped by the safety case & design intent arise.
D. That all commissioning activities demonstrates compliance with the safety case and design intent requirements as detailed in the Safety Commissioning Schedule and the programme logic (AC 21) (NUC 1.1 and 1.2).
Remote working within this role is something that can be discussed at interview stages or with your future line manager if you are found successful.
A. Suitable and sufficient Operating Instructions (AC 24) are in place for all Authorised Activites and that they are Authorised for use prior to commencement of the Activity e.g., AG Procedures, AG Instructions and HP Logics. (NUC 6.1 and 1.2) Ensuring:
That the Production, Maintenance and Development of the OIs is consistent with Authorisee’s Policies and Standards and Relevant Good Practice (RGP) in the wider Nuclear Enterprise (ONR/DNSR Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs), Technical Inspection Guides (TIGs), Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and NRPA Level 4 Methodologies etc.
That the OIs fully address the Safety Case and Design Intent Requirements with identification/highlight of those aspects critical to maintaining the CSFs i.e., AC23 Operating Rules/Operating Constraints and AC27 Engineered/Administrative Safeguards.
The OIs are consistent with industry good practice and legislative requirements e.g., LOLER, PUWER, RIDDOR, COSHH, Confined Space Regulations etc.
The OIs are cognitive to the end user (operator) this being achieved by demonstration and understanding and where appropriate formal training.
The OIs are appropriately verified and validated by appropriate SME and Operators this including where appropriate ‘slow run through’ of the scoped activity.
The OIs are formally reviewed at the Nuclear Services Authorisation Group (NSAG) and authorised for use.
The OIs are periodically reviewed to ensure they remain consistent with the Safety Case and Design Intent Requirements and RGP with appropriate capture of LFE.
B Appropriate oversight and supervision are imparted on activities important to the delivery and maintenance of Nuclear and Explosive Safety (AC26). (NUC 6.1, 1.1 and 1.2) Ensuring:
That all activities are appropriately permissioned prior to commencement with appropriate SMAs, and control is in place e.g., Hold Point Control, Nuclear Safety Clearance (NSCF, C12), Activity Logics etc.
That High Hazard Activities (i.e., those that can directly lead to a loss of CSFs) e.g., Fault recovery on Class 1 and Class 2; ensure direct control is imparted with a duly authorised co-ordinator appointed in accordance with AC26.
3. Directly impart oversight, supervision, and control on the following activities:
C* Embarkation (High Hazard)
Fault Recovery on Class 1 and Class 2 SSC (High Hazard)
As relief PAG Chair Docking of LUSMs at Rosyth
As relief Chair for Shiplift Docking of NPW including dockings with NW and TWS embarked (High Hazard)
4. The formal appointment of Nuclear Procedure Co-ordinators (NPCs) and appropriate oversight of their maintenance of qualification.
C. That Nuclear / Explosive safety is maintained when Site Activities not scoped by the safety case & design intent arise.
D. That all commissioning activities demonstrates compliance with the safety case and design intent requirements as detailed in the Safety Commissioning Schedule and the programme logic (AC 21) (NUC 1.1 and 1.2).
Remote working within this role is something that can be discussed at interview stages or with your future line manager if you are found successful.